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In a paper delivered to the Aristotelian Society on 12 March 1956,〔Published immediately as Gallie (1956a); a later, slightly altered version appears in Gallie (1964).〕 Walter Bryce Gallie (1912–1998) introduced the term essentially contested concept to facilitate an understanding of the different applications or interpretations of the sorts of abstract, qualitative, and evaluative notions〔They are "evaluative" in the sense that they deliver some sort of "value-judgement".〕—such as "art" and "social justice"—used in the domains of aesthetics, political philosophy, philosophy of history, and philosophy of religion. Garver (1978) describes their use as follows: The term essentially contested concepts gives a name to a problematic situation that many people recognize: that in certain kinds of talk there is a variety of meanings employed for key terms in an argument, and there is a feeling that dogmatism ("My answer is right and all others are wrong"), skepticism ("All answers are equally true (or false); everyone has a right to his own truth"), and eclecticism ("Each meaning gives a partial view so the more meanings the better") are none of them the appropriate attitude towards that variety of meanings.〔Garver (1978), p. 168.〕 Essentially contested concepts involve widespread agreement on a concept (e.g., "fairness"), but not on the best realization thereof.〔Hart (1961, p.156) speaks of "a uniform or constant feature", and "a shifting or varying criterion used in determining when, for any given purposes, cases are alike or different".〕 They are "concepts the proper use of which inevitably involves endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of their users",〔Gallie (1956a), p.169. The dispute is about the proper use of the concept; and all argue that the concept is being "used inappropriately" by others (Smith, 2002, p.332).〕 and these disputes "cannot be settled by appeal to empirical evidence, linguistic usage, or the canons of logic alone".〔Gray (1977), p.344.〕 ==Identifying the presence of a dispute== Although Gallie's term is widely used to denote imprecise use of technical terminology, it has a far more specific application. And, although the notion could be misleadingly and evasively used to justify "agreeing to disagree",〔A statement that, in essence, is usually nothing more than a simple observation that the apparent dispute it is simply a consequence of the same label being applied to different referents.〕 the term offers something more valuable: Since its introduction by W.B. Gallie in 1956, the expression "essentially contested concept" has been treated both as a challenge and as an excuse by social theorists. It has been treated as a challenge in that theorists consider their uses of terms and concepts to be in competition with the uses advocated by other theorists, each theorist trying to be deemed the champion. It has been treated as an excuse that, rather than acknowledge that the failure to reach agreement is due to such factors as imprecision, ignorance, or belligerence, instead theorists point to the terms and concepts under dispute and insist that they are always open to contest — that they are terms and concepts about which we can never expect to reach agreement.〔Rhodes (2000), p. 1.〕 The disputes that attend an essentially contested concept are driven by substantive disagreements over a range of different, entirely reasonable (although perhaps mistaken) interpretations of a mutually-agreed-upon archetypical notion, such as the legal precept "treat like cases alike; and treat different cases differently", with "each party () to defend its case with what it claims to be convincing arguments, evidence and other forms of justification".〔Gallie (1956a) p. 168.〕 Gallie speaks of how "This picture is painted in oils" can be successfully contested if the work is actually painted in tempera;〔Gallie (1956a), p. 167.〕 while "This picture is a work of art" may meet strong opposition due to disputes over what "work of art" denotes. He suggests three avenues whereby one might resolve such disputes: #Discovering a new meaning of "work of art" to which all disputants could thenceforward agree. #Convincing all the disputants to conform to one meaning. #Declaring "work of art" to be a number of different concepts employing the same name. Otherwise, the dispute probably centres on polysemy.〔The embedded meaning of the term ''polysemy'' is that the polysemous word’s meanings have multiplied over time (in the sense of its original meaning being extended). * When discussing finance, "bank" is an essentially contested concept; because the discussion involves establishing the "correct" application, meaning or interpretation of this polysemous term. * In a different dispute over banks, where one speaks of financial institutions and the other of riparian zones, it is obvious that two homonyms have been confused.〕 Here, a number of critical questions must be asked: * Has the term been incorrectly used, as in the case of mistakenly using decimated for devastated (catachresis)?〔Which is "''a conflict between truth and error''" (Garver, 1990, p. 259)〕 * Do two or more different concepts share the same word, as in the case of ''ear'', ''bank'', ''sound'', ''corn'', ''scale'', etc. (homonymy)?〔Which is "''a disagreement generated because the parties to the conflict are talking past each other''" (Garver, 1990, p.259) – the "talking past each other" is an allusion to the interaction between Thrasymachus and Socrates over the question of "justice" in Plato's ''Republic I'', where neither addressed any of the issues raised by the other. Gallie (1956a, p.168.) speaks of this as being a case in which "''two different concepts about whose proper application no none need to have contested at all''" having become "confused".〕 * Is there a genuine dispute about the term's correct application that, in fact, ''can'' be resolved? * Or, is it really the case that the term is an ''essentially contested concept''? 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「essentially contested concept」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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